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Spencer: The Surveillance Society and the Third-Party Privacy Problem

THE SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY AND THE
THIRD-PARTY PRIVACY PROBLEM

Shaun B. Spencer*
This Article examines a question that has become increasingly important in
the emerging surveillance society: Should the law treat information as private
even though others know about it? This is the third-partyprivacyproblem. Part
II explores two competing conceptions of privacy-the binary and contextual
conceptions. PartIII describes two features of the emerging surveillance society
that should change the way we address the third-partyprivacy problem. One
feature, "surveillance on demand, " results from exponential increases in data
collection and aggregation. The other feature, "uploaded lives, " reflects a
revolution in the type and amount of information that we share digitally. Part IV
argues that the binary conception cannot protect privacy in the surveillance
society because it fails to account for the new realities of surveillance on
demand and uploaded lives. Finally, Part V illustrates how courts and
legislators can implement the contextual conception to deal with two emerging
surveillance society problems-facial recognition technology and geolocation
data.
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INTRODUCTION

This Article examines a question that has become increasingly important in
the emerging surveillance society: Should the law treat information as private
even though others may know about it? I call this the "third-party privacy
problem." When information is available only to the subject of the information
and the subject's intended confidants, individuals have no third-party privacy
problem because no third parties are involved. The third-party privacy problem
arises when the information becomes available beyond the subject and his or her
confidants.
Third parties learn information about the subject in several ways. First, the
mere act of communicating information may share it with third parties. For
example, when I telephone my doctor about a sensitive medical condition, the
telephone company records the numbers that I dialed. Second, third parties may
observe the subject's activities. For example, when I walk across town to my
doctor's clinic, passersby can see me enter the clinic. In both of these situations,
I engaged in activities that I may want to keep between myself and my doctor.
Yet in both of these situations, third parties have learned about my activitiesthe phone number that I dialed and the clinic that I entered.
Part II explores two conflicting approaches that have emerged as courts and
legislators wrestle with the third-party privacy problem. The first approach is
the "binary" conception of privacy. Under the binary conception, courts and
legislators decide whether information is private by examining whether anyone

1.

See infra Part II.A. Many other commentators have described and critiqued a "binary" or

dichotomous conception of privacy.

See, e.g., HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT:

TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 113-14 (2010); DANIEL J. SOLOVE,
THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSsIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 7 (2007); Danielle

Keats Citron, Fulfilling Government 2.0's Promise with Robust Privacy Protections, 78 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 822, 826-27 (2010) (citing Alan Freeman & Elizabeth Mensch, The Public-Private
Distinction in American Law and Life, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 237, 247-50 (1987)); Daniel J. Gervais &
Daniel J. Hyndman, Cloud Control: Copyright, GlobalMemes and Privacy, 10 J. ON TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 53, 77 (2012).
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outside the subject or her confidants has access to the information.2 This Article
refers to these outsiders as "third parties." If no third parties have access, the
information is private; if third parties have access, the information is public.
The second approach is the "contextual" conception of privacy. Under the
contextual conception, courts and legislators decide whether information is
private by referring to the norms that surround the situation in which the third
party acquired the information.4 If those norms support the subject's claim to
keep the information within the subject's circle of confidants, then the
information is private.s
Part III describes two features of the emerging surveillance society that
change the way courts and legislators should address the third-party privacy
problem.
The first feature-"surveillance on demand"-results from
exponential increases in data collection and aggregation. 6 Data collection
technologies have exploded in recent years. In the online world, private and
governmental entities store vast databases of individuals' web searches, emails,
social network activities, and much more. And in the physical world, a host of
digital surveillance tools increasingly record our movements, our driving habits,
and even our moods. 9 The cost of building these "digital dossiers"10 has dropped
dramatically because data collection and aggregation have become de rigeur in
the emerging surveillance state." In addition, data aggregation renders all of this
information searchable "on demand" after the fact. Before the surveillance
society, a government or private actor had to identify a target in advance and
divert the necessary resources to track the target's activities.13 In the
surveillance society, however, interested parties can simply build a digital
dossier after the fact.14
The second feature-"uploaded lives"-reflects a revolution in both the type
of information we share and the manner in which we share it. We live an everincreasing portion of our lives through third parties. The convenience of cloud
computing puts our most sensitive personal information in the virtual hands of

2.

See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 22 (2008).

3. See infra Part II.B. The Author adapted this term from Helen Nissenbaum's argument for
"contextual integrity." NISSENBAUM, supra note 1, at 3.
4.

See Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REv. 119, 138

(2004).
5.

Id. at 141.

6.

See infra Part I.A.

7.

NISSENBAUM, supranote 1, at 19.

8.

Id. at 36, 39.

9.

See id. at 21-35.

10. For a discussion of digital dossiers, see Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the
DissipationofFourthAmendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1095 (2002).
11. NISSENBAUM, supranote 1, at 38-40.
12. Id. at 41-42.

13. See id at 38-45.
14. See id. at 40-42.
15.

See infra Part III.B.
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third parties, like Google and Amazon, rather than on physical drives that we can
keep secure in our homes or offices.16 Aspects of our social lives have moved
onto social networks that are easily shared and searched.
Smart phones and
cars transmit our locations to third parties.18 In a host of ways, we are uploading
our lives to third-party servers.
Part IV argues that the binary conception of privacy cannot address the
third-party privacy problem in the emerging surveillance society. For several
reasons, the surveillance society exposes the binary conception as too blunt an
instrument. First, the binary conception fails to distinguish between situations in
which a third party is a means to an end and situations in which the third party is
the end itself. For example, when I telephone my doctor, I do not intend the
phone company to be part of that conversation. Similarly, when I write a diary
entry and save it to a server in the cloud, I do not intend for Google to read my
diary. Yet the binary conception treats such instrumental sharing as equivalent
to communicative sharing. As we upload more of our lives to third parties in
easily searchable and sharable formats, the binary conception will not protect
many previously private realms.
Second, the binary conception fails to account for the "anti-aggregation
norm"-the fear of pervasive surveillance by government or private parties.20
Since large-scale databases first became a possibility, people have balked at the
idea of comprehensive databases that could hold all of the data about them.21
Finally, the availability of surveillance on demand undermines the binary
conception's assumption of consent.22 The consent assumption presumes that
we make informed decisions to provide particular third parties access to our
information.23 For example, if I drive across town, I understand that various
passersby may see me along the way, and I therefore consent to each of those
individual passersby knowing my location at a particular point in time. In the
surveillance society, however, the calculus changes. A host of digital
surveillance tools combine to record my movements every step of the way.24
Aggregating the individual data points creates the same effect as perpetual,
around-the-clock surveillance.25 And this digital data can converge in a single
database-accessible to third parties for decades to come.26 The assumption that
I consent to such pervasive third-party surveillance does not hold.

16. Gervais & Hyndman, supra note 1, at 57.
17. See James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1149 (2009).
18. See NISSENBAUM, supranote 1, at 53.

19. See infra Part IV.A.
20.
21.

See infra Part IV.B.
Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for

Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1394 (2001).
22.
23.
24.

See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part I.C.
NISSENBAUM, supranote 1, at 22-27.

25. See id. at 42-45.
26.

See id. at 41.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol65/iss2/3

4

Spencer: The Surveillance Society and the Third-Party Privacy Problem
THE TH[RD-PARTY PRIVACY PROBLEM

2013]

377

Part V illustrates how courts and legislators can use the contextual
conception to deal with the third-party privacy problem in the surveillance
society. The contextual conception of privacy is better calibrated to account for
the surveillance society's unique demands. Although it is more complicated to
apply, the contextual conception more accurately captures people's expectations.
This Part concludes by showing how courts can apply the contextual conception
to two emerging issues-facial recognition technology 2 7 and geolocation data.2 8
II. THE COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY
A.

The Binary Conception ofPrivacy

Under the binary conception, courts and legislators decide whether
information is private by examining whether anyone outside the subject, or the
subject's confidants, has access to the information.29 If no third parties have
access, the information is private; if third parties have access, the information is
public. 30 This binary conception appears in a variety of constitutional, common
law, and statutory approaches to privacy.
1.

FourthAmendment Jurisprudence

The Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence offers the most
prominent example of the binary conception of privacy. Courts determine
whether there has been a Fourth Amendment "search" by asking whether the
government has intruded on an area where the defendant had a "reasonable
expectation of privacy."31 In Katz v. United States,32 the Supreme Court held
that a person speaking on a public telephone had a justifiable expectation of
privacy in his conversation, and that the government violated this expectation by
wiretapping the telephone. 33 In an often-cited concurrence, Justice Harlan
explained that "reasonableness" entails a two-part, expectation-driven test.34
35
First, the defendant must have an actual or subjective expectation of privacy.

27. See infra Part V.A.
28. See infra Part V.B.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976) (citing 12 U.S.C.
§ 1829b(a)(1) (2012); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971); Hoffa v. United States,
385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438 (1963)) ("All of the
documents obtained, including financial statements and deposit slips, contain only information
voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of
business.").
30. See NISSENBAUM, supra note 1, at 113; SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 22.
31. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
32. 389 U.S. 347.
33. Id. at 353.
34. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
35. Id.
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Second, the ex ectation must be "one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.' 3
Under the Court's third-party doctrine, however, one cannot expect privacy
in information shared with third parties, "even if the information is revealed on
the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence
placed in the third party will not be betrayed." 37 Thus, in United States v.
Miller,38 agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms presented
allegedly defective grand jury subpoenas to two of Miller's banks. 39 The banks
made Miller's account records available to the agents.40 The records provided
one or two investigatory leads, and the grand jury later indicted Miller. After
copies of Miller's checks were introduced at trial, the district court denied
Miller's motion to suppress, and the jury found Miller guilty on charges related
to whiskey distilling and tax evasion. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that
procuring bank records through a defective subpoena violated the Fourth
Amendment.4 3 The Supreme Court granted the government's petition for
- -44
certiorari.
The Court held that subpoenaing the bank's records was not an unreasonable
search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.4 5 Miller argued that he
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his bank records because he only
made them available to his banks for a limited purpose.46 The Court rejected
Miller's argument, quoting its statement in Katz that "[w]hat a person knowingl
exposes to the public ... is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."
The Court reasoned that Miller's checks, financial statements, and deposit slips

36. Id.
37. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745, 751-52 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373
U.S. 427, 438 (1963)).
38. 425 U.S. 435.
39. Id. at 437-39.
40. Id. at 438.
41. Id
42. Id at 436-37. The charges were for "possessing an unregistered still, carrying on the
business of a distiller without giving bond and with intent to defraud the Government of whiskey
tax, possessing 175 gallons of whiskey upon which no taxes had been paid, and conspiring to
defraud the United States of tax revenues." Id at 436 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1371 (2012); 26 U.S.C.
§§ 5179, 5601 (2006); 26 U.S.C. § 5205 (repealed 1984)).
43. d at 437.
44. United States v. Miller, 421 U.S. 1010 (1975) (granting certiorari).
45. Miller, 425 U.S. at 440.
46. Id at 442. Miller also argued that, because the Bank Secrecy Act required the bank to
maintain Miller's records, the combination of the Bank Secrecy Act and the subpoenas allowed the
government to circumvent the protections that the Fourth Amendment would have provided had the
government sought documents directly from Miller. Id. at 441. The Court rejected that argument as
well. Id at 443 (citing Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 52-53 (1974); United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438 (1963)).
47. Id. at 442 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
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merely contained information that Miller "voluntarily conveyed" to the banks
and their employees, and that one who reveals his affairs to another takes the risk
that the other will convey that information to the government.48 The Court relied
on prior cases holding that the Fourth Amendment did not protect information
conveyed to others-even on the assumption that the information would be used
only for a limited purpose and held in confidence.49
The Court reaffirmed its binary approach three years later in Smith v.
Maryland.so In Smith, police suspected Smith of robbery and of placing obscene
and threatening phone calls to the robbery victim.51 The police asked the
telephone company to install a pen register at the company's central offices to
record the numbers dialed from the phone in Smith's home.53 The pen register
revealed a call to the victim's home, and police subsequently obtained a warrant
to search Smith's home.54 At trial, Smith moved to suppress all evidence
obtained and derived from the pen register. The trial court denied the motion,
and the jury convicted Smith.56
The Supreme Court held that Smith had no reasonable expectation of
privacy for the numbers that he dialed.
The Court reasoned that "[a]ll
telephone users realize that they must 'convey' phone numbers to the telephone
company" when they make a call, and that the phone company records the
numbers dialed and uses them for a variety of reasons. 8 Smith, therefore,
"assumed the risk" that the telephone company would reveal to the police the
numbers that he dialed.59
Thus, under the third-party doctrine, sharing information with a third party
removes any expectation of privacy as to that information.60 The third-party

48. Id. at 442-43 (citing White, 401 U.S. at 751-52).
49. Id. at 443 (citing White, 401 U.S. at 751-52; Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302; Lopez, 373 U.S. at
438).
50. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
51. See id. at 737.
52. The Court noted that "[a] pen register is a mechanical device that records the numbers
dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is
released. It does not overhear oral communications and does not indicate whether calls are actually
completed." Id. at 736 n.1 (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977)).
53. Id. at 737 (citations omitted).
54. Id. (citations omitted).
55. Id. (citations omitted).
56. Id. at 737-38 (citations omitted).
57. Id. at 743 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)).
58. Id. at 742.
59. Id. at 745.
60. Id. at 743-44; see also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442, 443 (1976) (citing
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302
(1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438 (1963)). In her concurrence in United States v.
Jones, Justice Sotomayor urged for reconsideration of the third-party doctrine, recognizing it as "ill
suited to the digital age." 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). For a thorough
discussion of the development of the third-party doctrine, see generally Stephen E. Henderson,
Nothing New Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search,
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doctrine prevails not only in the federal courts, but also in at least eighteen
states. 61
2.

Tort Law

Courts and commentators also rely on the binary conception of privacy in
the common law tort context. An early example appears in Dean William
Prosser's famous 1960 article titled Privacy.62 Discussing what he labeled
"intrusion," Dean Prosser observed:
On the public street, or in any other public place, the plaintiff has no
right to be alone, and it is no invasion of his privacy to do no more than
follow him about. Neither is it such an invasion to take his photograph
in such a place, since this amounts to nothing more than making a
record, not differing essentially from a full written description, of a
public sight which any one present would be free to see.63
Similarly, when describing the public disclosure of private facts, Dean
Prosser explained that "no one can complain when publicity is given to
information about him which he himself leaves open to the public eye, such as
the appearance of the house in which he lives, or to the business in which he is
engaged." 6 4 Elaborating on this point, he observed:
[A]nything visible in a public place may be recorded and given
circulation by means of a photograph, to the same extent as by a written
description, since this amounts to nothing more than giving publicity to
what is already public and what any one present would be free to see.

56 MERCER L. REv. 507, 510-21 (2005) (citations omitted) (arguing that the third-party doctrine
should be reexamined and clarified in light of current technological advances).
61. Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States: How to Apply the Fourth
Amendment and Its State Analogs to Protect Third Party Informationfrom UnreasonableSearch,
55 CATH. U. L. REv. 373, 395 tbl.1 (2006). As of 2006, Henderson noted that eleven states had
rejected the third-party doctrine, and another ten states may reject it. Id.
62. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383 (1960).
63. Id. at 391-92 (citing Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957, 963 (D.
Minn. 1948); Gill v. Hearst Publ'g Co., 253 P.2d 441, 445 (Cal. 1953); Chappell v. Stewart, 33 A.
542, 542-53 (Md. Ct. App. 1896); Lyles v. State, 330 P.2d 734, 745 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958)).
64. Id. at 394.
65. Id. at 394-95 (citing Berg, 79 F. Supp. at 962; Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 178
N.Y.S. 752, 758-59 (App. Div. 1919); Merle v. Sociological Research Film Corp., 152 N.Y.S. 829,
831-32 (App. Div. 1915); Lyles, 330 P.2d at 739; Sports & Gen. Press Agency, Ltd. v. "Our Dogs"
Publ'g Co., [1916] 2 K.B. 880 at 884 (Eng.)).
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Not surprisingly, in the wake of Dean Prosser's influential article, 66 portions
of the 1965 Restatement (Second) of Torts also embodied a binary conception of
privacy. 67 For example, section 652B describes "intrusion upon seclusion" as
intentionally intruding on another's solitude, seclusion, or private affairs.68
Comment c explains that no liability arises for examining what is "open to the
public eye" or "exhibited to the public gaze." 69 Similarly, section 652D
addresses liability for "public disclosure of private facts."
Comment b
precludes liability for publicizing what the plaintiff "leaves open to the public
eye." 71
The binary conception of privacy is also present in numerous common law
tort cases. For example, in Mark v. Seattle Times,72 a television cameraman
walked up a driveway to a pharmacy and videotaped the pharmacist through the
window. Although the pharmacy was closed at the time, the court reasoned
that there was no intrusion upon seclusion because the cameraman filmed from a
place open to the public and any passerby could have viewed the scene recorded
by the camera.74
The court applied the same approach to digital data in Interscope Records v.
Duty.75 In that case, various record companies sued Lindsay Duty for copyright
infringement based on her sharing of music through the peer-to-peer file-sharing
76
network, Kazaa. Duty counterclaimed for, among other things, intrusion upon
seclusion.
Duty claimed that the record companies invaded her privacy by
accessing the "share" file on her computer.78 The court, however, dismissed
Duty's claim for intrusion upon seclusion because Duty's share file was
accessible to the public and, therefore, could not support the tort's seclusion
element. 79

66. See generally Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser'sPrivacy Law: A Mixed
Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887 (2010) (discussing the importance and impact of Dean Prosser's
article in the development of the law of tort privacy).
67.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§§

652B, 652D (1977).

68. Id. § 652B.
69. Id. cmt. c.
70. Id. § 652D.
71. Id. § 652D cmt. b. But see infra Part II.B.2 (discussing other Restatement comments
evidencing a contextual conception of privacy).
72. 635 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1981).
73. Id. at 1094-95.
74. Id. at 1095 (citing McLain v. Boise Cascade Corp., 533 P.2d 343, 347 (Or. 1975)).
75. No. 05CV3744-PHX-FJM, 2006 WL 988086 (D. Ariz. Apr. 14, 2006).
76. Id. at *1.
77. Id. at *3.
78. Id. (citations omitted).
79. Id.
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Statutory PrivacyProtection

As Professors Paul Schwartz and Daniel Solove have described, some
privacy statutes condition protection on whether the information in question is
accessible to the public.80 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA), for
example, prevents financial institutions from disclosing "nonpublic information"
about a consumer without giving the consumer notice and an opportunity to opt
out. 1 Nonpublic information excludes any information that is not "publicly
available" as defined by regulation. 82 The applicable regulation defines publicly
available information as "any information that you have a reasonable basis to
believe is lawfully made available to the general public from: (i) ... government
records; (ii) [w]idely distributed media; or (iii) [d]isclosures to the general public
that are required to be made by Federal, State, or local law." 83 Similarly, the
Illinois Children's Privacy Protection and Parental Empowerment Act prohibits
the sale or purchase of personal information concerning a child without parental
consent. 84 Personal information, however, does not include "[i]nformation
found in publicly available sources."85
Both of these statutes take the type of all-or-nothing approach dictated by
the binary conception of privacy. Under these statutes, if the information
becomes available to the general public, the information is not entitled to
protection.86
B.

The Contextual ConceptionofPrivacy

Unlike the binary conception's bright line approach, the contextual
conception considers the particular circumstances in which the information was
shared.87 Helen Nissenbaum captured this contextual conception in her
argument for an approach to privacy based on "contextual integrity."88
Nissenbaum rejected the binary conception of privacy. 89 She reasoned that

80. Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PHProblem: Privacy and a New Concept of
PersonallyIdentifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1830 (2011). Schwartz and Solove
argued that the "publicly available" approach is problematic because "[t]he public or private status
of data often does not match up to whether it can identify a person or not." Id.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 6802(a), (b) (2012).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 6809(4)(A), (B) (2012).
83. 16 C.F.R. § 313.3(p)(1) (2013).
84.

325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 17/10 (2012).

85. Id. at 17/5. Similarly, Connecticut law imposes a duty to safeguard any personal
information about another person. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-471(a) (Supp. 2010). However, the
definition of personal information does not include "publicly available information that is lawfully
made available to the general public from federal, state or local government records or widely
distributed media." Id. §42-471(c).
86. See 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 17/5 (2012); CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 42-471(c) (Supp. 2010).
87. See Nissenbaum,supra note 4, at 137-38.
88. Id. at 136-46 (citations omitted).
89. See id. at 155-57.
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"personal information revealed in a particular context is always tagged with that
context and never 'up for grabs' as other accounts would have us believe
of... information gathered in public places." 90
Instead, according to Nissenbaum, contextual integrity exists in any situation
involving the disclosure of information in which two types of norms are
maintained: "norms of appropriateness" and "norms of information flow." 91
First, norms of appropriatenessdictate what information is appropriate to reveal
in a given context. Second, norms of informationflow dictate whether the flow
of information is one-way or two-way and whether the information can be shared
with others.9 3 In some contexts, people expect shared information to be held in
strict confidence or limited to a small group of confidants. 94 In others, people
expect that the information may be widely disseminated. 95
1.

FourthAmendment Jurisprudence

Today, many examples of the contextual conception appear in practice
alongside the binary conception. In search and seizure jurisprudence, for
example, numerous states have relied upon their own constitutions to reject the
binary approach of the Supreme Court's third-party doctrine. 96 As Professor
Stephen Henderson's thorough examination of this subject reveals, state courts
have been willing to find a reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records,97
telephone records, 98 and garbage left for curbside collection,99 despite the fact

90. Id at 143.
91. Id. at 138. According to Nissenbaum, "there is no place not governed by at least some
informational norms." Id. at 139.
92. Id at 138.
93.

See id at 140-43 (citing MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF

PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 320 (1983)).
94. Id at 142.
95. See id. at 141-43 (citing 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.103-.534 (2011); WALZER, supra note 93, at
320).
96. Henderson, supra note 61, at 396-400 tbl.2 & nn.118-28.
97. Id; see, e.g., Burrows v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d 590, 593 (Cal. 1974) (holding that one
retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records); People v. Lamb, 732 P.2d 1216, 1220
(Colo. 1987) (en banc) (recognizing a bank customer's expectation of privacy); Winfield v. Div. of
Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1985) (interpreting state law to reflect an
individual's expectation of privacy in financial records); State v. McAllister, 875 A.2d 866, 875
(N.J. 2005) (recognizing the Federal Government's efforts to protect privacy rights in bank records).
98. See, e.g., People v. Blair, 602 P.2d 738, 746 (Cal. 1979) (en banc) (holding that people
enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone numbers dialed from a hotel room and that
it was reasonable to believe these records were collected for billing purposes only); People v.
Timmons, 690 P.2d 213, 215 (Colo. 1984) (en banc) (affirming the suppression of wiretap and pen
register evidence obtained with a faulty search warrant); Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 151-52
(Fla. 1989) (recognizing the state must have a compelling reason to intrude upon telephone calls
because pen registers intrude upon fundamental privacy interests); State v. Mollica, 554 A.2d 1315,
1322 (N.J. 1989) (finding that a hotel using phone records for billing "does not diminish the
individual occupant's expectation of privacy in connection with personal use"); State v. Hunt, 450
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that those records and items were exposed to third parties. These courts rejected
the idea that sharing information with a third party automatically waives any
expectation of privacy and, instead, looked to the particulars of the context. 100
Recently, a majority of the Supreme Court applied a decidedly conceptual
approach to the expectation of privacy in public places. In United States v.
Jones,101 law enforcement officers placed a Global Positioning System (GPS)
tracking device on the defendant's car and monitored the car's movements for
four weeks. 102 The government used the GPS data to help obtain a drug
trafficking conviction, but the defendant appealed based on the lack of a valid
warrant to attach the GPS tracking device.
The Supreme Court held that the
government's GPS monitoring constituted a Fourth Amendment search that
required a valid warrant.104 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia relied on the
physical trespass associated with attaching a GPS device to a car.105 Justice
Alito, concurring in the judgment, reasoned that around-the-clock surveillance of
one's location for a month violates a reasonable expectation of privacy. 10 6
Justice Sotomayor wrote a separate concurrence in which she joined the Court's
opinion, but also adopted Justice Alito's position that such long-term GPS
surveillance violated a reasonable expectation of privacy.107
Justice Alito's concurrence represents a decidedly contextual approach to
locational privacy. Had Justice Alito taken a purely binar approach, he would
have followed the reasoning of United States v. Knotts, in which the Court
held that the law enforcement agents' use of a beeper to track the defendant's
vehicle did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search because one has no
expectation of locational privacy while on a public road. 109 Instead, Justice Alito
considered the context of the particular search-a month of continuous

A.2d 952, 955-56 (N.J. 1982) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967)) (comparing
the right of privacy for phone calls to the right of privacy in one's home).
99. See, e.g., People v. Edwards, 458 P.2d 713, 718 (Cal. 1969) (en banc) (holding that the
defendants enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy in their garbage); State v. Hempele, 576
A.2d 793, 810 (N.J. 1990) (holding that an expectation of privacy in garbage is reasonable and is
protected by the Constitution).
100. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
101. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
102. Id. at 948.
103. See id. at 948-49 (citing United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 566-68 (2010)).
104. Id. at 949.
105. Id. at 950. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court and was joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Thomas. Id. at 947.
106. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito was joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice
Breyer, and Justice Kagan. Id. at 957. Justice Alito's concurrence took the position that Katz v.
United States eviscerated the trespass doctrine. Id. at 959 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 353 (1967)). Justice Alito also suggested a potential exception that would permit long-term
monitoring for investigations involving "extraordinary offenses." Id. at 964.
107. Id. at 954, 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
108. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
109. Id. at 281-82, 285.
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surveillance. 110 He recognized a reasonable expectation that one would not be
subject to "long-term" monitoring because, before GPS technology, real-world
constraints made long-term monitoring extremely costly and impractical. 1
Justice Sotomayor went even further than Justice Alito by questioning the
continuing viability of the third-party doctrine.112 She found the third-party
doctrine "ill-suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out
mundane tasks." 113 Given this reality, Justice Sotomayor refused to assume that
disclosing information to some member of the public for a limited purpose
eliminated Fourth Amendment protection.114
2.

Tort Law

In their seminal article The Right to Privacy,'15 Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis adopted a contextual approach, rather than a binary one.116 Their
discussion of the right to prevent one's "public portraiture" recognized that one
could maintain a right to privacy even after displaying one's image to others by
walking on a public street.117
Although the Restatement (Second) of Torts contains language applying a
binary approach,118 it contains other language applying a contextual approach.
For example, section 652B protects against intrusion upon seclusion. 119
Comment b to section 652B observes that the information in question need not
be completely inaccessible to third parties.120 Instead, a defendant can intrude

110. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 963-64.
112. Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
113. Id.
114. Id.; see also Henderson, supra note 61, at 378 (citing Henderson, supra note 60, at 52428) (citations omitted) (proposing that the third-party doctrine should apply only to information
shared with the third party for that party's use); Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World
Without Privacy, 81 MIss. L.J. 1309, 1311 (2012) (observing that current Fourth Amendment
doctrine "places far fewer hurdles in front of the police when they use the fruits of somebody else's
surveillance than when they do the surveillance themselves"). Professor Ohm identified the same
problem as I do, but proposed a different solution. See Ohm, supra at 1310-11. Professor Ohm
suggested that privacy is doomed due to the emerging surveillance society and the government's
ability to "piggy-back" on private, third-party surveillance. Id. at 1311. His proposed solution is to
untether the Fourth Amendment from privacy and, instead, reinterpret the Fourth Amendment as a
protection of liberty from government power. Id. at 1311-12. I take the opposite approach by
urging that the binary conception of privacy be abandoned altogether. See infra Parts IV & V.
115. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193
(1890).
116. Id. at 206-20.
117. Id. at 213-14.
118. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
119. Id. § 652B.
120. Id. cmt. b.
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upon one's seclusion by examining that person's bank account, which
necessarily involves information that has been shared with a third party.121
Several California tort cases illustrate the contextual approach to privacy. In
Shulman v. Group WProductions,Inc.,122 a helicopter medical crew rescued the
plaintiffs after their car went off of a highway. 23 A television cameraman
accompanied the medical crew and filmed the rescue and transport to the
hospital.124 In addition, the rescue nurse's microphone recorded conversations
with one of the plaintiffs at the scene of the accident and in the rescue
helicopter.125 Group W Productions later used video and sound from the rescue
in a television show.126 The plaintiffs sued for intrusion upon seclusion, and the
trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment; the case then
reached the Supreme Court of California on appeal. 12 7
The court first evaluated the plaintiffs' claim that filming them at the
accident scene was an intrusion upon seclusion. 128 Although the court rejected
this claim, the court did not adopt a binary a roach in reasoning that there was
no expectation of privacy in a public place.
Instead, the court examined the
norms and customs surrounding the interaction at issue.130 First, the court noted
that journalists commonly film accident scenes and rescues.131 Second, the court
noted that California statutes exempt the press from certain emergency closure
orders.132 Based on these circumstances, the court held that filming at the
accident scene was not an intrusion upon the plaintiffs' seclusion.133
Next, the court held that filming the plaintiffs inside the rescue helicopter
could intrude upon their seclusion.
Again, the court relied on the norms and
customs surrounding the interaction 35: "Although the attendance of reporters
and photographers at the scene of an accident is to be expected, we are aware of
no law or custom permitting the press to ride in ambulances or enter hospital
rooms during treatment without the patient's consent."1 36
Finally, the court held that recording the plaintiffs' communications with the
rescue nurse could constitute an intrusion upon seclusion.137 The court again

121. Id.
122. 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
123. Id. at 474.
124. Id. at 474-75.
125. Id. at 475.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 490.
129. Id. at 490-91.
130. See id.
131. Id. at 490.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. Id.
137. Id at 491.
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based its conclusion on the norms and customs surrounding the interaction.138
Because the accident occurred "in a ditch many yards from and below the rural
superhighway," it was extremely unlikely that any passersby on the road could
have overheard the conversations.139 The court also noted that "existing legal
protections for communications," such as the physician-patient privilege and the
California Invasion of Privacy Act, supported a conclusion that one of the
plaintiffs reasonably expected her conversations to remain private. 140
Shortly after deciding Shulman, the California Supreme Court elaborated on
its contextual approach in Sanders v. American Broadcasting Cos.141 In
Sanders, an ABC reporter took a job as a telephone psychic and wore a hidden
camera in the workplace.142 The reporter's camera recorded her conversations
with several coworkers, including the plaintiff, Sanders.143 Sanders sued ABC
for intrusion upon seclusion. 14 4
ABC argued that Sanders could not claim to have been "secluded" because
his conversations were accessible to his coworkers.145 The court, however,
rejected the binary notion that an expectation of privacy must be absolute to
enjoy protection.
Instead, the court examined the context in which this
intrusion occurred.147 First, the court noted that Shulman's conversations were
accessible only to his coworkers-not to the general public.148 Second, the court
noted that one may enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy from electronic
recording of one's conversations, even when certain third parties may overhear
these conversations.149 Such "secret monitoring denies the speaker an important
aspect of privacy of communication-the right to control the nature and extent of
the firsthand dissemination of his statements."150 Explicitly rejecting the binary
conception, the court explained:
[P]rivacy, for purposes of the intrusion tort, is not a binary, all-ornothing characteristic. There are degrees and nuances to societal
recognition of our expectations of privacy: the fact the privacy one

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See id.
Id.
Id. at 491-92 (CAL. PENAL CODE § 632 (West 2007)).
978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999).
Id. at 69.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 73, 78.
Id. at 73-74.
Id. at 77.
Id.
Id. at 72.
Id. (quoting Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 492 (Cal. 1998)).
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expects in a given setting is not complete or absolute does not render the
expectation unreasonable as a matter of law.1 s'
3.

Statutory PrivacyProtection

The contextual approach finds favor in statutory regimes as well. For
example, the Federal Video Voyeurism Prevention Act prohibits capturing an
image of an individual's "private area ... under circumstances in which the
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy."1 52 The individual may enjoy
a reasonable expectation of privacy not only where "a reasonable person would
believe that he or she could disrobe in privacy," but also in any circumstance in
which a reasonable person would believe that his or her "private area" would not
be "visible to the public, regardless of whether that person is in a public or
private place."153 A Delaware statute governing the installation of video cameras
in schools takes a similarly contextual approach to privacy. 154 The statute
provides that "in no event shall video cameras be used at any time or at any
location which would violate a student's reasonable expectation of privacy
including, but not limited to, locker rooms, areas where students may disrobe
and lavatories."155
A Pennsylvania statute concerning GPS surveillance implements the
contextual conception of privacy in a different context.156 The statute gives
courts authority to order GPS surveillance by law enforcement on "probable
cause that criminal activity has been, is or will be in progress and that the use of
a mobile tracking device will yield information relevant to the investigation of
the criminal activity."157 The statute, however, limits the ability to monitor the
device in certain circumstances158 : "Movement of the tracking device within an
area protected by a reasonable expectation of privacy shall not be monitored
absent exigent circumstances or an order supported by probable cause ... .159

151. Id.
152. 18 U.S.C. § 1801(a) (2012). The Act applies only in the territorial or maritime
jurisdiction of the United States. Id.
153. Id. § 1801(b)(5). Although the federal statute applies only "in the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States," more than half of the states have enacted some form of
an anti-voyeurism statute. Id. § 1801(a); see, e.g., Timothy J. Horstmann, Comment, Protecting
TraditionalPrivacy Rights in a Brave New Digital World: The Threat Posed by Cellular-Phone
Cameras and What States Should Do to Stop It, 111 PENN ST. L. REv. 739, 742-46 (2007) (citations
omitted) (discussing the laws of the twenty-six states that have adopted anti-voyeurism statutes);
Antonietta Vitale, Note, Video Voyeurism and the Right to Privacy: The Time for Federal
Legislation Is Now, 27 SEToN HALL LEGIS. J. 381, 393-400 (2003) (citations omitted) (analyzing
state voyeurism statutes).
154. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4121 (2007).
155. Id.
156. 18 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5761 (West Supp. 2011).
157. Id. § 5761(c)(4).
158. Id. § 5761(g).
159. Id.
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Of course, legislation need not be keyed to reasonable expectations to
embody the contextual conception. The predominant legislative approach to
privacy in the United States is sector-specific, with protection for some types of
data but no protection for many others.160 Many of these sector-specific
protections provide examples of legislators examining the context in question
and deciding that the balance should tip in favor of privacy. For example,
Congress passed the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA)161 in the
wake of the 1989 stalking and murder of actress Rebecca Schaeffer by a
deranged fan who found her address through the department of motor
vehicles.162 The DPPA prohibited states from releasing drivers' personal
information for certain purposes without the drivers' consent, but allowed states
to presume such consent unless the drivers opted out. 163 A 1999 amendment
changed the DPPA's protection scheme to opt in so that states could not release
the information without drivers' express consent. 164
Similarly, in the wake of the controversial confirmation hearings following
Judge Robert Bork's Supreme Court nomination, Congress passed the Video
Privacy Protection Act of 1988 (VPPA).165 During the hearings, many were
shocked to learn that a journalist from Washington, D.C.'s City Paper had
obtained a printout of the movies Judge Bork rented from his neighborhood
video store. 66 Though many remember the controversy over a journalist
obtaining Judge Bork's video rental records in the hope of demonstrating that he
rented porno raphic films, fewer remember that the records revealed nothing
controversial
As it turned out, most of the 146 movies he rented were Disney
movies and Hitchcock films.168 Today, the VPPA allows civil suits against any
videotape service providers who knowingly disclose the titles of videos rented
by their customers.169 Videotape service providers may, however, disclose the
names of videos to law enforcement agencies pursuant to a warrant, grand jury

160. See Robert M. Gellman, Can Privacy Be Regulated Effectively on a National Level?
Thoughts on the Possible Need for InternationalPrivacy Rules, 41 VILL. L. REV. 129, 130 (1996)

("The United States approach to privacy is sometimes termed 'sectoral,' with separate and
uncoordinated laws applying to some personal records, and no laws applying to other records."
(citing Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private

Sector, 80 IOwA L. REV. 497, 500 (1995))).
161. Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 300002, 108 Stat. 2099
(1994) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2012)).
162. Jennifer S. Lee, Welcome to the Database Lounge: Bars and Shops Find Pay Dirt in
Scannable Driver'sLicenses, and Your Age Isn't All They Want, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002, at Gl.

163. Driver's Privacy Protection Act § 300002.
164. Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-69, § 350(c)-(e), 113 Stat. 986, 1025 (1999).
165. Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 3195 (1988)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012)).
166. See SIMsoN GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 72 (2000).

167. Id.
168. Id.
169. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1) (2012).
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subpoena, or court order, and may disclose the subject matter of the rented
videos for the purpose of marketing goods directly to the consumer, so long as
the consumer has a chance to opt out. o
The DPPA and VPPA are just two examples of the contextual conception of
privacy at work. In each case, Congress limited the sharing of data in the hands
of third parties by engaging a context-specific balancing of the competing
interests at play in each situation.
III. THE SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY

Scholars have predicted the rise of the surveillance society for several
decades. For example, in a 1998 article, Dr. Roger Clarke described what he
called "dataveillance," which is the systematic monitoring of people's actions or
communications through the application of information technology. 172 That
same year, Dr. David Brin predicted a future of pervasive surveillance from
video cameras, airborne drones, and massive aggregations of consumer data.173
As the digital revolution continued, many others followed in their footsteps.174
In many ways, the surveillance society is already here.
For example, our
computers share extensive data with third parties. Some of that sharing occurs
when we post personal information on social networking sites like Facebook.176
Much of the sharing, however, is less voluntary. For example, search engines

170. Id. § 2710(b)(2)(C), (b)(2)(D)(ii).
171. See Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 3195 (1988)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012)); Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-322, § 300002, 108 Stat. 2099 (1994) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2012)).
172. Roger A. Clarke, Information Technology and Dataveillance, 31 COMM. OF THE ACM
498, 498 (1988), available at www.anu.edu/au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/CACM88.html.
173. See DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO
CHOOSE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? 5-8 (1998).
174. See generally DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 (2003) (discussing
the intensification, integration, and globalization of surveillance since the September 11, 2001
attacks); DAVID LYON, THE ELECTRONIC EYE: THE RISE OF SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY (1994)
(addressing the implications of living in a "surveillance society"); CLIVE NORRIS & GARY
ARMSTRONG, THE MAXIMUM SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY: THE RISE OF CCTV 212-14 (1999)
(discussing an advanced "neural network" for processing digital video in the law enforcement
context); ROBERT O'HARROW, JR., No PLACE TO HIDE (2005) (painting a comprehensive picture of
how much information has been and will be gathered through surveillance tools available to
governments and businesses); David Wood, Foucaultand Panopticism Revisited, 3 SURVEILLANCE
& SOC'Y 234, 235-36 (2003), available at http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/articlesl(3)/
editorial.pdf (summarizing several journal articles organized under the common theme of
Panopticism, or constant surveillance, popularized by the modem French philosopher, Michel
Foucault); Ohm, supra note 114, at 1318 (referring to a "new surveillance society").
175. See, e.g., Jennifer Valentino-Devries, The Economics of Surveillance, WALL ST. J.
DIGITS BLOG (Sept. 28, 2012, 10:30 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2012/09/28/the-economics-ofsurveillance/ (offering an excellent summary of various third-party surveillance and data collection
techniques).
176. Grimmelmann, supra note 17, at 1149-51 (explaining how Facebook paints a complete
picture of its users' lives through the information it collects).
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like Google monitor the queries we type and the websites we visit."' And the
Internet service providers on whom we rely for essential connectivity record the
websites we visit, the files we download, and the people whom we email or
message. 178
Everyday transactions, both online and in real space, convey a plethora of
data to third parties.179 Our credit and debit card activity provides "a virtual
dossier of our daily activities." 180 Merchants have access to our weekly grocery
orders, medical and prescription drug purchases, the books we buy, the movies
we rent, and the causes to which we contribute.
Even our cars share increasing amounts of data.182 Law enforcement
agencies, as well as private "repo men," are using license plate readers that log
the location and time of day of each license plate that passes before the reader's
electronic eye.183 Over one-third of police departments were already using
automated license plate readers by 2010.184 Cars are now being built with "black
boxes" similar to those in commercial airliners.
These black boxes can
monitor speed and location, as well as communicate data about our driving
performance,186 to our auto insurance carriers. GPS devices are often built into
cars, and traffic cameras and electronic toll collection stations can track where
and when we travel.188
Finally, our bodies are beginning to share increasing amounts of
information. Facial recognition technology has been improving rapidly in recent

177. See, e.g., Quentin Hardy & Matt Richtel, Don't Ask? Internet Still Tells, N.Y. TIMES,

Nov. 22, 2012, at Al (depicting how users enter information that may be too private to even
disclose to friends into search engines, such as Google and Bing).
178. NISSENBAUM, supranote 1, at 27-31.

179. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 61, at 390 (discussing several examples of how people
convey data to third parties in everyday transactions).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., Julia Angwin & Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, New Tracking Frontier: Your
License Plates, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2012, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI00008

72396390443995604578004723603576296.html ("The rise of license-plate tracking is a case study
in how storing and studying people's everyday activities .. . has become the default rather than the
exception.").
183. Id.
184. CYNTHIA LUM ET AL., GEORGE MASON UNIV. CTR. FOR EVIDENCE-BASED CRIME
POLICY, LICENSE PLATE RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY (LPR): IMPACT EVALUATION AND

COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT 13 (2010), http://gemini.gmu.edu/cebcp/lpr final.pdf (noting that over

one-third of Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) members had adopted License Plate
Recognition Technology).
185. Donald W. Garland & Carol M. Bast, Is the Government Riding Shotgun? Recent
Changes in Automobile Technology and the Right to Privacy, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. 295, 295-96

(2010).
186. Id.
187. See id. at 295; Henderson, supra note 61, at 385 n.75.

188. Henderson, supra note 61, at 390.
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years as computer processing speed has increased.189 For example, Alessandro
Acquisti led a study that illustrated the potential of facial recognition technology

when combined with cloud computing and data aggregation.190 He first
photographed people using a laptop computer.191 He then used facial recognition
software to match those images to Facebook profiles, thereby determining their
identity.192 Matching the photographs to the Facebook profiles took under three
seconds, and the accuracy rate was about 33%.193 Finally, Acquisti used data
available on those social networking sites to determine the students' dates of
birth, interests, and the last five digits of their social security numbers.194 Facial

recognition and other biometric identification techniques are only increasing.195
This disparate array of data collectors poses a challenge for privacy
advocates because they cannot point to any master plan-sinister or otherwisebehind the surveillance society.196 No single "big brother" is gathering data.197
When one considers individual data collection practices, it is easy to treat each
practice in isolation as relatively harmless and largely defensible. Yet, in the
aggregate, the data collection system creates a nearly unimaginable wealth of
data to be mined. 198
This Article turns next to two aspects of the emerging surveillance society
that impact how we must handle the third-party privacy problem: the phenomena
of surveillance on demand and uploaded lives.

189. Valentino-DeVries, supra note 175 ("Consider facial recognition technology. Five years
ago, it only worked in very controlled settings such as passport checkpoints.... Within the past 18
months, the software has improved to allow faces to be matched even in regular snapshots and
online images .... This is in part because as computers become faster, the complicated geometric
analysis involved in analyzing faces can be done more quickly.").
190. ALESSANDRO ACQUISTI, RALPH GROSS & FRED SUTZMAN, FACES OF FACEBOOK:
PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF AUGMENTED REALITY, Presented at Black Hat (Aug. 4, 2011), available

at http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/face-recognition-study-FAQ/acquisti-faces-BLACKHATdraft.pdf.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See Valentino-DeVries, supra note 175 (discussing improvement in facial recognition
technology).
196. See, e.g., Alan Greenblatt, Our Surveillance Society: What Orwell and Kalka Might Say,
NPR (Jun. 8, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/06/08/189792140/our-surveillance-society-whatorwell-and-kafka-might-say ("It's not just the corporations performing surveillance ... average
citizens ... are also tracking and documenting each other's movements in real life these days.").
197. See id.

198. See, e.g., Patrick Tucker, Has Big Data Made Anonymity Impossible?, MIT TECH. REV.
(May 7, 2013), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/514351/has-big-data-made-anonymityimpossible/ ("[T]he amount of data created each year has grown exponentially: it reached 2.8
zettabytes in 2012, a number that's as gigantic as it sounds, and will double again by 2015 . . .
see also NISSENBAUM, supra note 1, at 36-38.
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Surveillance on Demand

We find a classic example of pervasive surveillance in Jeremy Bentham's
ideal vision of a prison: the Panopticon.199 The Panopticon's purpose was to
change prisoners' behavior through "the illusion of constant surveillance."200
Bentham envisioned a central tower with windows on all sides, surrounded by a
ring of cells occupied by the prisoners. 2 0 1 The cells open inward, and an
inspector in the central tower can monitor and speak to any prisoner at any
time.202 The Panopticon controls behavior because prisoners know their
behavior can be constantly monitored, but cannot know when the inspector is
monitoring them.203
Today's digital data collection and storage facilitate a more pervasive
Panopticon. Because digital data are easily stored and searchable,2 4 today's
watchers can decide whom they would like to observe after the fact, and then
search for the relevant data.
This aspect of today's surveillance society
resembles the "time shifting" made possible by video cassette recorders and
206
Rather than watching what happens to be on
digital video recorders.
television at a given moment, time-shifting viewers can watch any program from

199. See generally MICHEL

FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON

195-308 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) (discussing the surveillance context of Bentham's
Panopticon).
200. REG WHITAKER, THE END OF PRIVACY: HOW TOTAL SURVEILLANCE IS BECOMING A
REALITY 33 (1999) (quoting Miran Bofovic, Introduction to JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON
WRITINGS 16 (Miran Bofovic ed., 1995)). Bentham trumpeted his idea as a "new mode of
obtaining power of mind over mind, in a quantity hitherto without example." Id. at 34 (quoting
BENTHAM, supra at 30). Reg Whitaker termed the modem state of widespread surveillance as the
"Participatory Panopticon." Id. at 139.
201. Id. at 32.
202. Id. at 32-33.
203. Id. An elaborate system of "lanterns and apertures" renders the Inspector a silhouette so
the prisoners cannot see his face. Id at 33. Focault noted that "[h]e who is subjected to a field of
visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them
play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he
simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection." FOUCAULT,
supra note 199, at 202-03.
204. The cost for businesses to "store and use a gigabyte of information for a year dropped
from $18.95 in 2005 to $1.68 in 2012, and it's expected to drop to just 66 cents in 2015."
Valentino-DeVries, supranote 175.
205. See JOHN VILLASENOR, CTR. FOR TECH. INNOVATION AT BROOKINGS, RECORDING
EVERYTHING: DIGITAL STORAGE AS AN ENABLER OF AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENTS 1 (Dec. 14,
2011), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/12/140% 20digital
o20storage/o20villasenor/1214 digital storage villasenor.pdf ("These enormous databases of
captured information will create what amounts to a surveillance time machine, enabling state
security services to retroactively eavesdrop on people in the months and years before they were
designated as surveillance targets.").
206. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984)
(describing "time shifting" as "us[ing] a [video recorder] principally to record a program he cannot
view as it is being televised and then to watch it once at a later time").
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any channel at any moment in the past-subject to the programs they decide to
record and the available storage capacity. 207 The surveillance society, however,
automatically records virtually all channels at all times, and there appears to be
no limit as to how much data the many collection entities can store.208 The
"channels" being recorded in the surveillance society are ever expanding. 209 For
example, the total quantit of the world's recorded data doubled every year from
the mid-1990s to 2008. 0 According to the big data management company
Zettaset, a staggering 2.5 quintillion bytes of Big Data are captured daily from
consumers and "80% of data captured today is ... posts to social media sites,
purchase transaction records, and cell phone GPS signals." 211 Acxiom, a leading
data broker, claims to have data concerning "500 million active consumers
worldwide, with about 1500 data points per person." 2 12
Private data brokers aggregate information from various private databases to
create consumer profiles for sale to private or public parties. 213 In a recent
response to questions from members of Congress, Acxiom reported collecting
the following types of information:
*
*
*
*

Identifying information such as name, address, land and mobile
phone, email, social security number, and driver's license number;
Court and public agency records such as criminal history,
bankruptcies, judgments, liens, and licenses;
Demographic information such as date of birth, race, ethnicity,
religious affiliation, marital status, presence of children in the
household, education, occupation, and political party affiliation;
Financial indicators such as estimated net worth, estimated income,
and type of credit cards used;

207. See id. at 422-23.
208. See, e.g., David Von Drehle, The Surveillance Society, TEVIE (Aug. 1, 2013),

http://nation.time.com/2013/08/01/the-surveillance-society (explaining that it is more cost effective
for intelligence agencies to record everything and analyze the data at a later date).
209. See id.; see also Glen Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects 'Nearly Everything a

User Does on the Internet,' THE GUARDIAN (July 31, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data ("A top secret [NSA] program allows
analysts to search ... through vast databases containing emails, online chats and the browsing
histories of millions of individuals . . . .").
210. Christopher Slobogin, Government DataMining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI.
L. REV. 317, 317 (2008) (citing JEFFREY W. SEIFERT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31798, DATA
MINING AND HOMELAND SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW 2 (2007), available at http://www.fas.org/

sgp/crs/intel/RL31798.pdf).
211. See

What is Big Data and Hadoop?, ZETTASET,

http://www.zettaset.com/info-

center/what-is-big-data-and-hadoop.php (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
212. Natasha Singer, You for Sale, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2012, at BU1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/technology/acxiom-the-quiet-giant-of-consumer-databasemarketing.html? r-0.
213. See Neil M. Richards, Reconciling DataPrivacy and the FirstAmendment, 52 UCLA L.

REV. 1149, 1157 (2005).
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Health information such as interests in particular conditions or
diseases; and
Lifestyle indicators such as shopping preferences, media usage, and
types of social media used. 14

In the past, it was impractical for the government to search for data about
every citizen, and this technological barrier effectively limited the government's
suspicion.215
data mining efforts to situations involving some particularized
Today, however, with the rise of large-scale private data collection and
aggregation, the government can now conduct many more automated
investigations-for example, it can easily find all of the people who bought
books about particular topics.216 In fact, as Professor Christopher Slobogin
explained, many governmental data mining efforts rely largely on "commercial
data brokers[ ] to provide their input, which is then analyzed by government
officials."2 17 These data brokers offer a plethora of data about individuals:
[Such data] includ[es] basic demographic information, income, net
worth, real property holdings, social security number, current and
previous addresses, phone numbers and fax numbers, names of
neighbors, driver records, license plate and VIN numbers, bankruptcy
and debtor filings, employment, business and criminal records, bank
account balances and activity, stock purchases, and credit card
activity. 218
Thus, the government can aggregate in one place all of the individual pieces
of information that people convey to many different third parties over many
years, which can now be used for "unrelated, unexpected, and typically
undesired purpose[s]." 219
Information released by Google offers one example of the government's
reliance on third-party data. Google fields ever-increasing numbers of such
requests from the government each year. 22 0 For example, the following chart
shows the total number of government data requests sent to Google for the six-

214. Letter from Jennifer Barrett Glasgow, Global Privacy & Pub. Policy Exec., Acxiom
Corp., to Representative Edward Markey, U.S. House of Representatives (Aug. 15, 2012)
[hereinafter Acxiom Response], available at http://geekslop.com/main/wp-content/uploads/2012/
11/Acxiom response to lawmakers.pdf.
215. DANIEL J. SOLOVE,

THE DIGITAL PERSON:

TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE

INFORMATION AGE 181 (2004).

216. Id.; see also Solove, supra note 21, at 1400-13 (providing an excellent summary of the
history of public and private databases).
217. Slobogin, supranote 210, at 320.
218. Id.
219. Henderson, supra note 61, at 392.
220. Transparency Report, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdata
requests/data (last visited Nov. 14, 2013).
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month periods ending from December 2009 to June 2013.221 Where the data are
available, the chart also shows the percentage of requests with which Google
complied.222
Table 1: U.S. State and Federal Government Requests for Google User
Data223-2009-2012
End Date of Six-Month
Number of Government
Percentage in Which
Period
Requests
Google Supplied Data
12/31/2009
3,580
(not available)
6/30/2010
4,287
(not available)
12/31/2010
4,601
94%
6/30/2011
5,950
93%
12/31/2011
6,321
93%
6/30/2012
7,969
90%
12/31/2012
8,438
88%
6/30/2013
10,918
82%
Cellular telephone providers face even more government requests for
information than Google. 24 In 2011, cellular telephone providers responded to
at least 1.3 million requests for information about cellular telephone
subscribers. 225 As long as the government does not seek information about the
content of the call, the government can request information about where the
cellular phone was located at a particular time, or whom a person called or
emailed on a particular day.226 To obtain such information, the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act merely requires the government to persuade a
judge that there are "reasonable grounds to believe" that the information sought
is "relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation." 2 27
Government reliance on commercial data is not limited to criminal
investigations. As Edward Snowden revealed in 2013, the National Security
Agency (NSA) has received telephone records for virtually every domestic
telephone subscriber for years.228 The NSA obtained these records pursuant to

221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Compare Adam Liptak, The Public Is Left in the Dark When Courts Allow Electronic
Surveillance, N.Y. TuvIES, July 24, 2012, at A15 ("[C]ell phone carriers responded to at least 1.3
million requests for subscriber information last year."), with supra Table 1 (noting that Google
received 12,271 requests for user data from governments in 2011).
225. Liptak, supra note 224.
226. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c), (d) (2012).
227. § 2703(d).
228. See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Subscribers Daily,
THE GUARDIAN, June 5, 2013, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsaphone-records-verizon-court-order; Administration White Paper, Bulk Collection of Telephony
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Foreign Intelligence Service Court (FISC) orders directing all major telephone
providers to give the NSA "telephony metadata" for all of their customers'
telephone calls. 22 9 This metadata includes the telephone numbers of incoming
and outgoing calls, as well as the time and duration of every call.230 Further, the
records are not limited to international calls; they include calls between domestic
numbers. 23 1 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has also accessed private
telephone records in its investigations, although it has done so through a private
contract, rather than a court order.232 Unlike the NSA's bulk collection program,
the CIA's contract does not call for copies of all telephone records. 233 Instead,
when the CIA finds a telephone number of a terrorist overseas, the CIA provides
that number to AT&T, which searches its records and provides the NSA with
call logs for the terrorist's number.234
The unprecedented scope of today's data mining raises the stakes for courts
and legislators trying to address the third-party privacy problem. Adopting the
binary approach will give both governments and private data brokers free rein to
build extensive digital dossiers on every citizen.
The binary conception fuels
the third-party doctrine, which allows the government to circumvent the Fourth
Amendment and gather data that would otherwise be available only through a
search of the individual citizen's records. 236 The binary conception would also
counsel against protection for the data we are increasingly placing in the hands
of third parties.237

Metadata Under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act 1-2 (Aug. 9, 2013), available at http://op.

bna.com/der.nsf/id/sbay-9aeu73/$File/Administration%/ 20White%/20Paper%/20Section%/20215.pdf.
229. See Greenwald,supra note 228; In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for
an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [Redacted] (In re Bulk Metadata Collection
Program), No. BR-13-109, 1-2 (FISA Ct. Oct. 11, 2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/

uscourts/courts/fisc/brl3-09-primary-order.pdf.
230. See In re Bulk Metadata Collection Program,No. BR-13-109, at 2 & n.2; Administration

White Paper, supra note 228, at 7.
231. Administration White Paper, supra note 228, at 3.
232. Charlie Savage, CIA Is Said to Pay AT&Tfor CallRecords, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2013, at
Al, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/07/us/cia-is-said-to-pay-att-for-call-data.html.

233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See, e.g., Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother'sLittle Helpers: How ChoicePointand Other
Commercial DataBrokers Collect and Package Your Datafor Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT'L

L. & COM. REG. 595, 595-96 (2004) (discussing privacy concerns arising from digital profiles of
private citizens containing confidential information).
236. See id. at 621-22 (citing Yuval Dror, Big Brother is Watching You and Documenting,

HAARETZ, Feb. 20, 2003, www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/big-brother-is-watching-you-anddocumenting-1.18491) (arguing that private data brokers circumvent traditional Fourth Amendment
protections by aggregating vast amounts of information on almost any adult and making the
aggregated data available to law enforcement).
237. See id. at 622.
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B. UploadedLives
Increasingly, we are living our lives in "the cloud." Cloud computing refers
to providing computing services through the Internet, rather than on a local
drive.238 Examples of cloud computing include web-based email services like
Gmail, 239 online storage services like Carbonite, 2 40 and business applications like
Google Apps for Business.241 Cloud computing's benefits include "faster
deployment of computing resources, a decreased need to buy hardware or to
build data centers, and more robust collaboration capabilities."24 2
The move to cloud computing marks a paradigm shift in computer and
Internet usage. Prior to widespread Internet usage, data was kept largely on
central or mainframe computers, or on isolated individual computer hard
drives.243 Widespread Internet adoption enabled a shift to what Professor Daniel
Gervais and Daniel Hyndman call a "connection Aaradigm," in which the
Internet acted as a network connecting computers.
Under the connection
paradigm, users worked with data and software on their own computers and used
the Internet to "transmit processed data between two or more computers." 245
Cloud computing marks a shift to an "amalgamation paradigm." 246 For Gervais
and Hyndman, this amalgamation paradigm means that users' devices are mere
tools to access "private and commercial content amalgamated on server farms
operated by major intermediaries." 247 The cloud computer works with data
located on external computers one does not own or control and which that person
cannot even locate.248
Examining how cloud computing arose may suggest where it is headed. As
Internet bandwidth gradually increased, there came a point when relatively lowbandwidth software could function as effectively in the cloud as on the user's
computer.249 Early examples were web-based email providers, which did not

238. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-513, INFORMATION SECURITY:
FEDERAL GUIDANCE NEEDED TO ADDRESS

CONTROL ISSUES WITH IMPLEMENTING CLOUD

COMPUTING 2 (2010).

239. See Gmail, GOOGLE, http://www.gmail.com (last visited Nov. 14, 2013).
240. See CARBONITE, http://www.carbonite.com (last visited Nov. 14, 2013).
241. See GOOGLE APPS FOR BUSINESS, http://www.google.com/enterprise/apps/business (last

visited Oct. 7, 2013).
242. U.S.

Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY

OFFICE,

GAO-10-513,

INFORMATION

SECURITY:

FEDERAL GUIDANCE NEEDED TO ADDRESS CONTROL ISSUES WITH IMPLEMENTING CLOUD

COMPUTING 1 (2010).

243. See Gervais & Hyndman, supra note 1, at 55.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 57 (citing Nelson Minar & Marc Hedlund, A Network of Peers: Peer-to-Peer
Models Through the History of the Internet, in Peer to Peer: Harnessing the Power of Disruptive

Technologies 3 (Andy Oram ed., 2001)).
246. Id. at 55.

247. Id.
248. Id. at 57.
249. Id. (citing Arif Mohamad, A History of Cloud Computing, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM

(Mar. 27, 2009), http://www.computerweekly.com/feature/A-history-of-cloud-computing).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol65/iss2/3

26

Spencer: The Surveillance Society and the Third-Party Privacy Problem
2013]

THE THIRD-PARTY PRIVACY PROBLEM

399

even require a constant flow of data.250 As bandwidth expanded, cloud-based
services-such as YouTube-arose that could stream video and audio
instantly. 251 Gervais and Hyndman predict that, with ever evolving bandwidth
and network infrastructure, the cloud will expand to new areas.252 They see the
probable "end game" as "one in which all digital content is either stored
exclusively on, or at least backed up on, the Cloud." 2 53
Cloud-based computer services are exploding in popularity. 254 A 2010
survey predicted that some five billion devices would be connected to the
Internet in September 2010 and that an astonishing twenty-two billion devices
would be connected by 2020. 255 An increasing percentage of those Internet
connected devices are smartphones.256 A 2012 survey found that social media
usage accounts for nearly one-third of all the time that smartphones are
connected to the Internet.257
Email ranks second, constituting 16% of
smartphone usage time.258
This rise of cloud computing is changing the types of information that we
entrust to third parties. Gervais and Hyndman predict that "soon everything
digital will be in the Cloud, including our personal data."2 59 The cloud already
260
holds our songs,26
books,26126and movies.2 We have also entrusted significant

250. Id. at 57-58.
251. Id. at 58.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Paul Lanois, Privacy in the Age of the Cloud, J. INTERNET L., Dec. 2011, at 3, 3 (noting
that use of cloud-computing services grew by more than 60% from spring 2010 to 2011).
255. Press Release, HIS Elecs. & Research, Internet Connected Devices About to Pass the 5
Billion Milestone (Aug. 19, 2010), available at http://imsresearch.com/press-release/Intemet
Connected Devices About to Pass the 5 Billion Milestone.
256. Id.
257. Social Media Dominates Smartphone Internet Time, Accountingfor Almost One-Third of
Minutes, GFK (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.gfk.com/us/news-and-events/News/Pages/Social-MediaDominates-Smartphone-Intemet-Time.aspx.
258. Id In contrast to smartphone users, laptop and desktop computer users do not spend as
much time on social media. Id. The study showed that laptop and desktop users spend their time
online in the following manner: 18% on social media, 18% on email, 13% on online video, and 11%
on searches. Id. In addition, the trend is for smartphone users to account for a greater percentage of
total Internet connection time. Id. In 2011, computers accounted for 83% of Internet time,
compared to 12% for smartphones. Id. In 2012, however, that gap closed to 73 % for computers
and 17% for smartphones. Id. Tablets accounted for 3% in 2011 and 6% in 2012; Internet TVs
accounted for 2% in 2011 and 4% in 2012. Id.
259. Gervais & Hyndman, supra note 1, at 54.
260. See, e.g., iTunes, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/itunes/features/#everywhere (providing
that all music purchased from or added to iTunes can be accessed from all of the user's other
devices through the cloud) (last visited Nov. 15, 2013).
261. See, e.g., id. (stating that ebooks and audiobooks purchased through iTunes can be
accessed through iCloud).
262. See, e.g., id. (stating that movies purchased through iTunes accounts can be accessed by
all of that users devices through the cloud).
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personal information to the cloud, like financial information263 and tax
records. 264 We are increasingly backing up our data to the cloud. 265 We post
vast amounts of personal communications, thoughts, feelings, and photographs
on social media, such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.
And with Google
Apps offering the most popular software services online,267 and Google's new
Chromebook laptops poised to use web-based storage, rather than a local hard
drive, 268we are shifting toward creating data in the cloud in the first place. 269
Cloud computing will also bring about a structural change to the
"shareability" of our data.270 When data exist on devices under our control, we
must take steps to share that data. However, once the data migrate into the hands
of cloud-based third parties, sharing becomes the default. 271 In fact, it may prove
impossible to make our data disappear completely.272
The end result of all of this cloud-based sharing is that we are uploading
substantial portions of our lives to third parties. 273 This paradigm shift to cloud
computing makes third parties an extension of ourselves. Cloud computing takes
what was once done on a local hard drive and places it in the hands of third

263. See, e.g., Your FinancialLife, All in One Place, MINT, http://www.mint.com/what-ismint (providing that users can access all of their financial data online from any device) (last visited
Nov. 15, 2013).
264. See, e.g., TURBOTAX, http://turbotax.intuit.com (providing online product services to
allow customers to access their tax records from anywhere) (last visited Nov. 15, 2013).
265. See Eric A. Taub, Storing Your Files Inside the Cloud, N.Y. TVIMES, Mar. 2, 2011, at B7,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/03/technology/personaltech/03basics.html?pagewant
ed=all& r-O.
266. See Lanois, supra note 254, at 3.
267. See Apps Marketplace, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/enterprise/marketplace/?pli=1
(last visited Nov. 15, 2013).
268. See IntroducingChromebook, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/intl/en/chrome/business/
devices/features-different.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2013).
269. See, e.g., id. ("Chromebooks have a cloud storage service called Google Drive built-in so
you can save your work safely in the cloud. Traditional computers often require you to back up
your files manually.").
270. Gervais & Hyndman, supra note 1, at 55.
271. Id. at 79.
272. Id. at 78 ("Once personal data is in the Cloud, there is no way to know with certainty
where it is stored, which laws apply to that storage, and who might see it. In certain cases, it may
simply not be possible to truly delete the information."); see also Jeffrey Rosen, The Deciders: The
Future of Privacy and Free Speech in the Age of Facebook and Google, 80 FORDHAM L. REV.
1525, 1533 (2012) (discussing efforts in the European Union to enact a "right to be forgotten").
273. See Henderson, supra note 61, at 390 (discussing the various ways that people upload
sensitive information to third parties); see also Alex Williams, Here IAm Taking My Own Picture,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2006, § 9 (SundayStyles), at 1 (describing "digital self-portraits"); Jonathan
Zittrain, Net Neutrality as Diplomacy, YALE L. & POL'Y REV. INTER ALIA (May 1, 2010, 10:00
AM), http://yalelawandpolicy.org/sites/default/files/YLPRIA29 Zittrain.pdf ("The
Internet
is ... the paramount way we communicate with one another, and the means by which we establish
our own digital selves.").
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parties.274 Electronic data on static media under our control are shareable, but
data in the cloud are already shared.275
Part III has illustrated two significant features of the surveillance society:
surveillance on demand and uploaded lives. Next, Part IV explains why these
changes render the binary conception ineffective to address the third-party
privacy problem.
IV. THE BINARY CONCEPTION'S INABILITY TO PROTECT PRIVACY IN THE
SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY

The binary conception allows for only two states: private and not private.
This indiscriminating approach overlooks the varying degrees of privacy
expectations that individuals actually hold. In particular, the binary conception
fails to account for three features of how people think about privacy. First, the
binary conception ignores the difference between sharing with third parties as
ends and sharing with third parties as mere means. Second, the binary
conception ignores the anti-aggregation norm-our deep-seated aversion to mass
surveillance. Finally, the binary conception rests upon a flawed assumption of
consent.
A.

The Binary Conception's Failure to Distinguish Third Parties as Ends

from Third Partiesas Means
Sometimes we share information with third parties with the expectation that
those third parties will receive and convey that information. When I update a
website hosted by, for example the uber-advertised service GoDaddy.com, I
share information with GoDaddy.com with the expectation that GoDaddy.com
will receive my information and make it available to anyone browsing my
website. Or when I "tweet," I share information with Twitter with the
expectation that Twitter will make my tweet available to any Twitter user who
chooses to "follow" me.
In contrast, there are many situations in which we share information with
third parties but do not intend for those third parties to pass our information
along to others. For example, when we engage in online banking, we willingly
share information with the bank, but we do not expect the bank to share that
information with third parties. Similarly, when we use cloud-based backup
providers like Carbonite to store our backup data, or when we create and store
documents in the cloud using Google Docs, we do not expect our files to be

274. See, e.g., Gervais & Hyndman, supra note 1, at 55 ("[U]ser computers and devices are
merely tools used to access private and commercial content amalgamated on server farms operated
by major intermediaries .... ).
275. See, e.g., id. at 57 ("[W]ith Cloud computing, the user stores (uploads) and accesses
(downloads) data located on external computers that the user does not own, does not control, and
cannot locate.").
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shared with third parties. These cloud-computing services are merely tools that
we use to accomplish purposes unrelated to sharing our data.
The binary conception of privag ignores this distinction and treats all thirdparty access as a waiver of privacy.
In the context of the third-party doctrine,
Professor Henderson urges that courts apply this doctrine only when information
was provided for the third 2 7arty 's use-thus distinguishing information
recipients from mere couriers.
Similarly, in Justice Marshall's dissent in
Smith v. Maryland,278 he observed that "[t]hose who disclose certain facts to a
bank or phone company for a limited business purpose need not 279
assume that this
information will be released to other persons for other purposes."
B.

The Binary Conception's Failure to Account for the Anti-Aggregation
Norm

George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four280 and Franz Kafka's The Trial281
offer popular illustrations of our societal aversion to the all-knowing watcher.282
As Professor Solove explains, Orwell presented a vision of "Big Brother [a]s an
all-knowing, constantly vigilant government that regulates every aspect of one's
existence-even one's private thoughts." 283 The Big Brother metaphor
"understands privacy in terms of power."284 Kafka presented a different but
equally disturbing vision.285 According to Professor Solove, "Kafka depicts an
indifferent bureaucracy, where individuals are pawns, not knowing what is
happenin§, having no say or ability to exercise meaningful control over the
process."
Kafka's protagonist, Josef K., embodies "the sense of helplessness,
frustration, and vulnerability one experiences when a large bureaucratic
organization has control over a vast dossier of details about one's life." 2 87 Both
of these dystopian visions embody a societal fear of pervasive surveillance: the
anti-aggregationnorm.

276. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
Court determines that individuals who convey information to third parties have 'assumed the risk'
of disclosure to the government." (citing id. at 744-45 (majority opinion))).
277. Henderson, supra note 61, at 526.
278. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
279. Id. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
280. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (Secker & Warburg 1999) (1949).

281. FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (Edwin Muir & Willa Muir trans., definitive ed., Everyman's
Library 1992) (1925).
282. See Solove, supranote 21, at 1395-99 (citations omitted).
283. Id. at 1413.
284. Id. at 1415.
285. See id. at 1421.
286. Id.
287. Id.
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Lawmakers and legal academics often invoke "Orwellian" or "Kafkaesque"
metaphors in their discussions of pervasive government surveillance.288 Today,
however, societal concerns about the all-knowing "other" are not limited to
289
government actors.
Professor Solove observed that, while life in the digital
age has brought "a dizzying amount of information":
[I]t has also placed a profound amount of information about our lives in
the hands of numerous entities. These digital dossiers are increasingly
becoming digital biographies, a horde of aggregated bits of information
combined to reveal a portrait of who we are based upon what we buy,
the organizations we belong to, how we navigate the Internet, and which
shows and videos we watch.2 90
Similarly, Professor Ohm warns that the proliferation of both public and
private databases and the ability to "re-identify" what were thought to be
anonymous data combine to simulate a "database of ruin" that contains harmful
information about everyone.291
This anti-aggregation norm figured prominently into the Supreme Court's
rejection of long-term, warrantless GPS surveillance in United States v. Jones.292
In the Court's prior vehicle surveillance cases, the Court had reasoned that
tracking by traditional visual observation for several days was not a search for
Fourth Amendment purposes. 293 In Jones, however, five members of the Court
distinguished those traditional methods from long-term GPS surveillance. 294In
his concurrence, Justice Alito reasoned:
[T]he use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most
offenses impinges on expectations of privacy. For such offenses,

288. See, e.g., id. at 1395-99 (citations omitted) ("Journalists, politicians, and jurists often
describe the problem created by databases with the metaphor of Big Brother. . . ."); see also Parker
B. Potter, Jr., Ordeal by Trial: Judicial References to the Nightmare World of Franz Kajka, 3

PIERCE L. REv. 195, 256-71 (2005) (discussing cases in which judges cited both Orwell and
Kafka). But see Neil M. Richards, The Information PrivacyLaw Project,94 GEO. L.J. 1087, 1128-

33 (2006) (citations omitted) (book review) (critiquing the utility of Kafka's The Trial as a
metaphor for database privacy issues).
289. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 10, at 1095 ("The government is increasingly contracting
with private sector entities to acquire databases of personal information.").
290. Id.
291. Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of

Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REv. 1701, 1748 (2010).
292. 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("I would ask whether people
reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables
the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits,
and so on.").
293. Id. at 951-52 & n.6 (majority opinion) (citing United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 70708, 713 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278, 279, 281-82, 284 (1983)).
294. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 955-56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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society's expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others
would not-and indeed, in the main, simply could not-secretly monitor
and catalogue every single movement of an individual's car for a very
long period.295
Justice Sotomayor recognized the anti-aggregation norm even more
explicitly in her concurrence.
She observed that "GPS monitoring generates a
precise, comprehensive record of a person's public movements that reflects a
wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations," and that the "Government can store such records and efficiently
mine them for information years into the future." 297 Justice Sotomayor would
have addressed the reasonable expectation of privacy issue by asking whether
people "reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated
in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their
political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on."29 8
Implicit in Justice Sotomayor's reasoning is the failure of the binary
conception of privacy. By simply asking whether each piece of data is known to
any third party, the binary conception of necessity ignores the anti-aggregation
principle. It ignores the difference between knowing a few individual pieces of
data about a person, and knowing all of the data about that person.
C.

The Binary Conception'sFlawedReliance on the Myth of Consent

The binary conception rests largely on the assumption that allowing any
third-party access to one's data means consent to any future sharing of one's
data. In United States v. Miller,299 for example, the Court reasoned that the
third-party doctrine denied any expectation of privacy for data shared with a
third party, "even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be
used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will
not be betrayed." 3 00 Despite this expectation, the Court reasoned that "[t]he
depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information
will be conveyed by that person to the Government." 301
This assumption of consent, however, does not comport with reality. As
Justice Marshall observed in his dissent in Smith v. Maryland, "Implicit in the

295. Id. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan joined Justice Alito in his concurrence. Id. at
957.
296. See id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
297. Id. at 955-56 (citing United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir.
2010) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)).
298. Id. at 956.
299. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
300. Id. at 443 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971); Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438 (1963)).
301. Id. (citing White, 401 U.S. at 751-52).
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concept of assumption of risk is some notion of choice." 302 For several reasons,
however, the realities of the surveillance society preclude any notion of choice.
First, the imbalance of bargaining power precludes consumer choice. 303 Social
networking sites like Facebook, as well as major email and messaging services
like Gmail and Twitter, have become "unavoidable" for millions of users.304
Gervais and Hyndman argue that this leads to such a disparity in bargaining
power that, "As a matter of contract law, the differential in bargaining power
arguably affects the validity of major waivers of protection in license and other
end-user agreements." 30s As a practical matter, this imbalance in bargaining
power precludes people from withholding data about themselves from third
parties.
Second, even if individuals had sufficient bargaining power to choose, they
would lack the information necessary to exercise that power wisely. Consumers
are entirely unaware of the existence of some data collection practices.307 For
example, researchers discovered in 2011 that iPhones and iPads were keeping a
log of information about their owners' geolocation and transferring that log to
computer hard drives when synced-all without their owners' knowledge.308
Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission reported that consumers are often
unaware of the types of data that data brokers gather, the purposes for which
With regard to
those data are used, and even the existence of data brokers.
other practices, consumers may have a general awareness of the data collection,
but lack the information to make an informed choice.310 For example, Professor
James Grimmelmann has explained in detail why Facebook users have no
meaningful way to assess the risk that the information they share on Facebook
will be used beyond their Facebook "friends." 311 Instead of basing their
decisions on hard data, the users instead rely on a collection of heuristics that

302. 442 U.S. 735, 749 & n.1 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Lacking the Court's
apparently exhaustive knowledge of this Nation's telephone books and the reading habits of
telephone subscribers ... I decline to assume general public awareness of how obscene phone calls
are traced.").
303. See Gervais & Hyndman, supra note 1, at 79.
304. See id.
305. Id.
306. See Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 843, 898-900 (2002) (citations omitted).
307. See Nick Bilton, Tracking FileFound in iPhones,N.Y. TIVIES, Apr. 21, 2011, at Bl.

308. Id.
309. FED. TRADE COMM'N, PROTECTING CONSUMIER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE:

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES

AND POLICYMAKERS, at iv, 68 (2012), available at

http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf.
310. See, e.g., Grimmelmann, supra note 17, at 1160 ("The social dynamics of social network
sites do more than just give people a reason to use them notwithstanding the privacy risks. They
also cause people to misunderstandthose risks.").
311. Id. at 1160-64 (citing ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
PERSUASION 114-66 (2007); PATRICIA WALLACE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE INTERNET 14-19
(1999); Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1083 (2006) (book review)).
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understate the risk.312 Similarly, with regard to data gathered from Internet
browsers, only 38% of consumers say they are even "generally aware of ways
they themselves can limit how much information about them is collected by a
website." 3 13
V. IMPLEMENTING THE CONTEXTUAL CONCEPTION OF PRIVACY

Although implementing the contextual conception of privacy may prove
complicated, it can help courts and legislators deal with new technologies more
effectively than the binary conception. This Article concludes with two
illustrations of how the contextual conception can apply to several emerging
surveillance society issues: facial recognition and geolocation data.
A. FacialRecognition Technology
Facial recognition technology converts images of faces into sets of
measurements and then compares those measurements against an existing
database of measurements to try to find a matching face. 314 Facial recognition
technology could be combined with existing networks of public and private
video surveillance cameras.315 The technology can also be used with networks
of drones, which could provide surveillance at a fraction of the cost of using
more traditional methods. 316 And the database of facial images is not limited to
images that law enforcement can create-it
can be drawn from publicly available
317
websites such as social networking sites.

312. Id. at 1164.
313. KRISTIN PURCELL ET AL., PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, PEW RESEARCH CTR.,

SEARCH ENGINE USE 2012, at 25 (2012), available at http://pewintemet.org/~/media/Files/Reports

/2012/PIP Search Engine Use 2012.pdf.
314. Adam Schwartz, Chicago's Video Surveillance Cameras: A Pervasive and Poorly
Regulated Threat to Our Privacy, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 47, 50 1 17 (2013) (citing
LUCAS D. INTRONA & HELEN NISSENBAUM, CTR. FOR CATASTROPHE PREPAREDNESS &
RESPONSE, N.Y. UNIV., FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY: A SURVEY OF POLICY AND

IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 11, 15-17 (2009), available at http://www.nyu.edu/ccpr/pubs/Niss

04.08.09.pdf).
315. See id. at 50
14, 17. Researchers are now working on techniques to reliably track
subjects as they pass from the view of one camera to the next. See generally Riccardo Mazzon &
Andrea Cavallaro, Multi-Camera Tracking Using a Multi-Goal Social Force Model, 100
NEUROCOMPUTING (SPECIAL ISSUE) 41 (2013), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/

science/article/pii/S092523121200327X (citations omitted) (describing methods by which peoples'
movements can be tracked across multiple cameras); Kevin Hartnett, Watching You Between
Surveillance Cameras and Other Recent Highlightsfrom the Ideas Blog, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 3,

2013, at K12 (discussing the research on developing an algorithm that predicts people's paths).
316. See Yochi J. Dreazen, From Pakistan,with Love, NAT'L J., Mar. 13, 2011, at 40; Ellen
Nakashima & Craig Whitlock, Air Force'sNew Tool: 'We Can See Everything,' WASH. POST, Jan.

2, 2011, at Al.
317. See What Facial Recognition Technology Means for Privacy and Civil Liberties Before
the Subcomm. on Privacy, Tech. and the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2, 4-6
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If a major city combined facial recognition capability with a network of
surveillance cameras monitoring public spaces, it could face a Fourth
Amendment challenge. A court applying the binary conception likely would
dispense quickly with such a challenge. Under the traditional third-party
doctrine, one could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in a face exposed
to public view.
The contextual conception, however, would permit a more nuanced
approach by recognizing norms that the binary conception ignores. First,
exposing our faces to public view is generally not an end in itself, but merely a
means to an essential public good-the ability to travel from one location to
another.318 Second, pervasive facial recognition triggers the anti-aggregation
norm that Justices Sotomayor and Alito recognized in United States v. Jones.319
Unconnected strangers noting your passage at various points on your journey is
qualitatively different from a pervasive system tracking your every movement in
public. Finally, there can be no meaningful consent to such a pervasive video
surveillance system because the scope of the surveillance is difficult to
conceive, 32 0 and because people must travel on public ways to function in
modern society.321 All of these norms would weigh in favor of a reasonable
expectation that the government cannot build a searchable database of places at
which every face travels within its video surveillance network.
Legislators will also make different decisions based on which conception of
privacy they adopt.322 Under the binary conception, they would not be likely to
restrict surveillance using facial recognition technology because there would be
little motivation to protect citizens who are already in public view.323 On the
other hand, legislators applying a contextual conception might take a more
nuanced approach. Recognizing that people have not meaningfully consented to
such pervasive surveillance, legislators could prohibit law enforcement from
using facial recognition techniques in criminal cases, unless supported by a
warrant backed by probable cause. 324 In addition, legislators could recognize the
anti-aggregation norm by prohibiting law enforcement from creating a general
database of facial recognition images, while still allowing them to search for a

(2012), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/12-7-18AcquistiTestimony.pdf (testimony
of Professor Alessandro Acquisti, Carnegie Mellon University).
318. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("It is idle to
speak of 'assuming' risks in contexts where, as a practical matter, individuals have no realistic
alternative.").
319. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
320. See id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
321. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
322. See Spencer, supra note 306, at 858 ("We cannot ignore ... the role of social
expectations in the legislative process.").
323. See id. at 860 ("[U]nless the public has a strong desire for privacy in a particular area,
attempts to pass legislation establishing that area as a private sphere are doomed to fail.").
324. Cf S. 3287, 112th Cong. §§ 3, 6 (2012) (prohibiting the use of drones to gather evidence
of criminal conduct absent a warrant supported by probable cause, as well as the use of any
evidence obtained in violation of the act).
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particular individual's facial characteristics after obtaining a warrant backed by
probable cause.32 5
B. GeolocationData

Both government and private entities are increasingly seeking access to
geolocation data. 326 Geolocation data can identify the location of wireless
devices like cell phones.327 Although mobile phones are one popular source,
geolocation data can also come from tablets, laptops, traditional desktops, and
even cars.328 Geolocation data can also be found in photographs that we post
online; indeed, a Raytheon engineer has developed software to map a subject's
travels based on metadata within people's Facebook photographs.329 Once
disparate geolocation data are collected by individual entities, data brokers can
aggregate them and provide a comprehensive database of people's travels.330
Given the tremendous amount of data that private data warehouses can
gather, consumers may seek relief under various common law theoriesassuming no statutory violation has occurred-such as intrusion upon seclusion,
public disclosure of private facts, or unfair trade practices.331 If the court adopts
the binary conception, however, the court could take an approach similar to the

325. Cf 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/34-18.34 (2013) (providing that, if a school collects facial
recognition evidence about a student, the school must only use it for identification and fraud
prevention, must destroy it within thirty days of the student's graduation, and must not share the
information without consent from the student (or the student's guardian) or a court order).
326. See e.g., Thomas Garry et al., Intelligent TransportationSystems: PersonalData Needs

and Privacy Law, 39 TRANSP. L.J. 97, 98 (2012) ("Global positioning systems ('GPS')
technology ... is now commonplace in cellular phones, cars, bicycle computers, and even runners'
watches.").
327. See id.; see also Tracie E. Wandell, Geolocation and Jurisdiction: From Purposeful
Availment to Avoidance and Targetingon the Internet, 16 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 275, 291-95 (2011)

(citations omitted) (discussing technologies used to identify locational data of Internet users).
328. Garry et al., supra note 326, at 98.
329. See Ryan Gallagher, Defence Giant Builds 'Googlefor Spies'to Track Social Networking
Users, THE GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 11, 2013, at 1.
330. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Signaling Exhaustion and Perfect Exclusion, 10 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 321, 325 (2012) ("By aggregating data from multiple databases and

geolocation services, and using data mining techniques to find whatever patterns exist, companies
like Verizon and Apple can piece together consumer profiles that make FICO scores look
exceptionally crude."); see also Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A

General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REv. 1005, 1014 (2010) ("A very different dynamic exists with
electronic data. Data sent, stored, and received over the Internet can be copied repeatedly, instantly,
and freely. It can be zipped around the world in a split second, and it can be stored anywhere and
without cost. The data does not occupy any physical space, and it can be divided up and distributed
anywhere.").
331. See Gervais & Hyndman, supra note 1, at 86 ("These [license and other end-user
agreements] are often enforced through and are subject to state consumer protection laws. As such,
abuse or misuse of personal information, can be considered a form of unfair or deceptive business
practice."); Spencer, supra note 306, at 851-57 (citations omitted) (discussing the tort law of
privacy protection).
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third-party doctrine. Under such an approach, the court would reason that there
was no invasion of privacy or any aspect of unfairness because consumers
entrusted their data to vendors without promises that the third parties could never
access their data.
As with the facial recognition example, the contextual conception will
permit consideration of social norms that the binary conception disregards. First,
although consumers may share their geolocation data when they use navigation
apps in their phones or cars, or browse the Internet with their laptops, that data
sharing is merely the means to navigating their day-to-day lives.
Second,
when data warehouses combine all geolocation data from all available sourcesboth real world and online-about each consumer, they offend the antiaggregation norm. When consumers share data with each individual vendor or
service provider, they are comfortable sharing that information with the vendor
or provider because it may improve their service or form part of their transaction,
and they are not sharing a complete, 24/7 virtual map of their lives. 333 Thus,
consumers still may object to massive aggregation of all of their data. Finally,
given the complexities of the marketplace for consumer data, consumers cannot
be said to consent in any meaningful way to pervasive data aggregation when
they do business with each individual vendor or service provider.
These three
context-specific concerns-which the binary conception ignores-would favor
treating the aggregation of consumer geolocation data as an invasion of privacy.
Geolocation data have already drawn Congress's attention, although
Congress has not yet passed geolocation legislation.
A purely binary approach
would counsel against regulation of the third-party collection or sharing of
geolocation data because consumers have shared their data with third parties.
The contextual conception, however, suggests the need for legislative action.
One attempt at such action appeared in the Location Privacy Protection Act of
2012 (LPPA), which was introduced in the 112th Congress by Senator Franken
and reported with amendments by Senator Leahy. 336 The LPPA would restrict
the collection and sharing of geolocation data from devices such as mobile
phones and automobiles.
The Act would also prevent private entities-like
cellular phone providers and GPS navigation system providers-from collectin
or sharing consumers' geolocation data without "express authorization." 3

332. See Henderson,supra note 60, at 526 (noting a distinction between revealing information
to a third party for that party's use and revealing information to a third party as a means to an end).
333. See Garry et al., supra note 326, at 115 ("Most individuals having [sic] a strong stated
preference for maintaining the privacy of their movement and travel habits.").
334. See Gervais & Hyndman, supra note 1, at 79 ("Either [users] don't use the service and
risk being left out in the cold, or they use the service and trust the provider not to use their
information in some undesirable way."); Spencer, supranote 306, at 892 ("Consumers are generally
unaware of the variety of ways that businesses collect information about them.").
335. See Location Privacy Protection Act of 2012, S. 1223, 112th Cong. (2012).
336. Id.
337. Id. § 3.
338. Id.
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Express authorization would require the consumer's express written consent
after receiving a notice-separate from the general terms of service-of (1) the
information to be collected, (2) the specific individuals with whom the
information may be shared, and (3) the means by which the consumer may
revoke consent.
This legislative limitation on collecting and sharing geolocation data would
recognize the contextual norms at play. First, by requiring express consent to the
gathering of geolocation data, the bill would recognize that a consumer, as a
general matter, does not set out to share geolocation data. Any sharing that takes
place is merely incidental because the geolocation data sharing is merely a
means to the consumer's end of completing a transaction or using a service.
Second, by requiring the vendor to obtain the consumer's consent and to identify
the specific entities with whom it proposes to share the data, the bill would
recognize the anti-aggregation norm. And third, by ensuring that consumers
receive explicit notice of the information to be gathered and the parties with
whom it may be shared, the bill would make it more likely that any geolocation
data would not be collected or shared without meaningful consent.
VI. CONCLUSION

The emerging technology of the 1890s prompted Warren and Brandeis to
reshape the existing approaches to protecting one's information and likeness. 340
The rapid changes in today's surveillance society require that we do the same
with regard to the third-party privacy problem. Changes in technology are
driving more and more of our data into the hands of third parties, and those data
are becoming increasingly easy to collect, aggregate, and mine. If the binary
conception guides how courts and legislators approach the third-party privacy
problem, the result will be that sharing data with one third party means sharing
that data with all third parties. Only the contextual conception captures what the
binary conception ignores. The binary conception cannot distinguish sharing as
a means to an end from sharing as the end itself. And the binary conception
ignores society's long-held anti-aggregation norm and relies on a flawed
assumption of consent. The adaptability of the contextual conception will allow
judges and legislators to balance more accurately the competing concerns
affected by any given data-sharing situation.

339. Id.
340. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 115, at 195.
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